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The divergence of growth and inflation rates across EMU in recent years has 
reignited the debate as to whether Europe is really an “optimum currency area”  
in which monetary union yields net benefits. But answering this question is 
complicated inter alia by the further controversy over whether economic 
integration and, in particular, monetary union tend to cause convergence or 
divergence of business cycles. Past studies have found convergence under the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) regime of the 1980s, but the final verdict on the 
1990s and especially on the period since the start of EMU is still pending. Several 
studies, such as Böwer and Guillemineau (2006), compute the unweighted 
average of countries’ bilateral correlations and find convergence in the 1990s and 
divergence since then, but this is largely caused by an outlier in Greece.  
We argue that similar to the treatment of inflation in monetary policy, for which a 
country’s inflation rates are weighted by the relative size of a country’s private 
consumption, one has to look at weighted GDP growth rates. Using these, we find 
synchronisation, i.e. a further increase in correlation, both during the 1990s and 
since the start of EMU, but only the former change is significant. These findings 
are subsequently confirmed by the development of inflation dispersion over time. 
We infer that, unlike during the run-up to EMU, the introduction of a common 
monetary policy itself has not brought about a great reduction in business cycle 
heterogeneity, and synchronisation will probably be limited in the coming years as 
well. This means that policy-makers at the national level need to do more to 
improve their economies’ flexibility, in order to make them better able to cope with 
the remaining heterogeneity in output and inflation. 
Christoph Basten (christoph.basten@upf.edu) 
 
Business cycle synchronisation 
in the euro area 















Strong convergence of growth rates in the 1990s
Weighted average of EMU countries' GDP growth rates with that of the euro area as
a whole
Sources: OECD Comparable Table, DB Research1
1. Context: Without sufficient business cycle synchronisation, 
monetary union causes net losses 
 
The recent divergence of GDP growth rates across the economies in the euro are 
has reignited the debate as to whether EMU business cycles are sufficiently 








Sources: Eurostat, own calculations
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Mundell: Costs of monetary union higher, the more business cycles differ 
 
In academia, the debate on monetary union (MU) started with Robert Mundell’s 
seminal article “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas” (1961)
 . He showed that, on 
the one hand, MU yields benefits by eliminating transaction costs, boosting price 
transparency and competition, eliminating exchange rate uncertainty, increasing the 
allocative efficiency of the price mechanism, lowering real interest rates, encouraging 
further FDI by maximising credibility of the exchange rate peg, and fostering further 
integration
1.
On the other hand though, costs arise as countries with different business cycles 
have to cope under the same monetary policy, which cannot be optimal for each of 
them individually. The magnitude of these costs depends on the degree of hetero-
geneity of countries’ business cycles, as well as on the availability of alternative 
responses to idiosyncratic shocks. But the scope of alternative responses to 
asymmetric shocks is rather limited in Europe, especially when compared to the 
frequently cited benchmark United States. Labour mobility traditionally was and still is 
significantly lower, inter alia due to cultural and language barriers, as is the degree of 
financial integration between countries. At the same time, recent debates about the 
reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) have reminded us of economists’ 
traditional wariness about smoothing output through fiscal policy, given reservations 
about its effectiveness, its political economy and, particularly in the case of monetary 
union, potential negative externalities on neighbouring countries. 
 
1 The most recent instances of strife towards further integration include the “Single Euro Payments Area” (SEPA) 
and the “Financial Services Action Plan” (FSAP) 
The vicious circle of real interest rate 
divergence 
While faster-growing economies with 
higher inflation, like Spain, would need 
higher interest rates than their 
counterparts, such as Finland, different 
rates of inflation translate the common 
ECB nominal interest rate into lower – in 
some cases even negative – interest rates 
for them. This in turn stimulates their GDP 
growth and inflation, reinforcing the cycle 
divergences amongst EMU economies. 
Divergence is increased even further when 
higher tax revenues in face of the boom 
trigger tax cuts, as in recent years in 
Ireland. 2
Studies in the 80s and 90s agreed: EMU worthwhile for EU-6, but not for EU-15 
 
For monetary union to yield net benefits, so much was clear from Mundell’s 1961 
article, Europe would need to have sufficiently homogeneous business cycles, i.e. 
there should be neither significant asymmetric shocks, nor too much heterogeneity in 
the propagation mechanism. To what extent either of these kinds of heterogeneity 
exists, Mundell concluded, “reduces to an empirical rather than a theoretical 
question”. As a result, the 1980s and 1990s saw a proliferation of studies comparing 
the degree of economic integration between European countries to that between the 
US or Canadian states. Not all methodologies used were uncontroversial, and yet 
some consensus emerged in the early 1990s, which implied that a core of European 
countries comprising Germany, France, the “BeNeLux” area and possibly Austria 
probably did fulfil the OCA criteria, whereas a larger group including also the 
countries at the “periphery” of Europe, such as Greece, did not
2.
1980s – EU-5 is an optimum currency area, but EU-15 is not. 
To constitute an Optimum Currency Area, 
an area must have little enough output 
divergence or enough “flexibility” (crudely 
put) or a suitable combination of these two. 
The AA line in the graph illustrates the 
critical minimum of these two desiderata 
required for MU to yield net benefits. 
Some consensus existed in the 
1980s/1990s that the EU-5 or possibly EU-
6 could fulfil these requirements, while a 
larger group of European countries could 
not. 
 
Frankel and Rose: Monetary Union promotes synchronisation 
 
And yet the debate was not over at this point, as some economists suggested that 
the fulfilment of the OCA criteria might be endogenous. The most prominent 
proponents of this argument are Frankel and Rose (1998)
 3, who put forward two 
hypotheses. Firstly, they argued that, by eliminating exchange rate risk and bringing 
about greater economic and financial stability, monetary union will lead to an 
intensification of bilateral trade. Secondly, this increase in trade volume will lead to a 
more equal spread of demand shocks, as well as a greater correlation of policy 
shocks through more similar policies, which in turn will lead to greater synchronis-
ation of business cycles. A slightly different channel is emphasised by Coe and 
Helpman (1995): As more trade leads to knowledge and technology spillovers, it will 
also lead to a more similar supply structure and will thus enhance output symmetry. 
 
2 This view is supported inter alia by Eichengreen (1990), Neumann & Van Hagen (1991), Bayoumi & Eichen-
green (1993, 1997), De Grauwe & Heens (1993), De Grauwe & Vanhaverbeke (1993), Beine et al (2003); all are 
cited in De Grauwe, The Economics of Monetary Union, 5
th edition, Oxford University Press 2003 
3 Frankel, J. and Andrew Rose, The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria, The Economic Journal, 








Krugman disagrees: Monetary union promotes de-synchronisation 
 
However, Paul Krugman (1993)
4, while granting that monetary union may intensify 
trade, argued that precisely this intensification of trade links might also intensify 
economic specialisation and could thus make business cycles more heterogeneous. 
In the worst case, this means that the costs of monetary union would rise faster than 
the benefits (which also increase with the intensification of trade). However, this 
scenario is rather questionable, as it has the absurd implication that a common 
currency would be most desirable for two countries that otherwise have nothing to do 
with each other. But there is a more plausible version in which costs still rise as 
economic integration proceeds, albeit less quickly than benefits. This would not imply 
that monetary union becomes less desirable over time, but it would mean that it 
would take longer for a region to endogenously become an Optimum Currency Area. 
 
The great controversy – Krugman versus Frankel & Rose 
Synthesis: Synchronisation if enough of the additional trade is intra-industry 
 
But is Krugman right? Two objections can be made against a scenario in which trade 
causes the costs of MU to rise over time. Firstly, more trade need not increase 
economic specialisation. Much trade between advanced countries is intra-industry 
trade, which would not lead to more heterogeneous shocks.
5 In fact, Melitz (2004) 
argues that additional trade is more likely to concern price-elastic goods, i.e. more 
differentiated products, which results in more intra-industry trade. This presumption is 
confirmed by Imbs (2004) who finds that since 1999 the Euro area has experienced a 
significant increase in intra-industry trade. In the same vein, many specialised 
regions may transgress national borders, in particular between the smaller countries 
like Belgium and the Netherlands. 
 
4 Krugman, P. (1993), Lessons of Massachusetts for EMU, in (eds.) Torres F. and F. Giavazzi: Adjustment and 
Growth in the European Monetary Union, Cambridge University Press 
5 More specifically, intra-industry “horizontal” trade, such as engines for chassis, would not lead to an asymmetry 
of shocks, whereas trade in qualities, such as Fiats vs. Mercedes, still could do so in the presence of taste shifts; 
For details on this distinction, see: Fontagné and Freudenberg (1999) 





Krugman: More inter-industry trade 
boosts trade and thus economic 
specialisation 
￿ Ceteris paribus, tends to 
increase cycle heterogeneity 
• Frankel & Rose: More trade 
means demand shocks in one 
country have a bigger impact 
on demand for the goods of 
the trading partners 
• Melitz and others: New trade is 
mainly intra-industry trade, so 
it does not promote further 
specialisation 
￿ Ceteris paribus, tends to  
decrease cycle heterogeneity4
A good example is automotive production in the “Euregio” region around the German 
city of Aachen. It includes the Ford plant in Cologne/Germany (producing Ford 
Fiesta), the Ford plant in Genk/Belgium (producing Ford Mondeo and Ford Galaxy), 
the DAF truck plant in Eindhoven/Netherlands, the Philips automotive electronics 
plant in Eindhoven/Netherlands, the NedCar/Mitsubishi plant in Born/Netherlands, 
and many component suppliers. Many of them cooperate with the various 
engineering research institutes connected to Aachen Technical University (RWTH). 
Changes in the world market demand for cars will thus simultaneously affect three 
countries, as specialisation does not stop at national borders. 
 
But even if trade alone tends to make business cycles more heterogeneous via 
specialisation, it is not the only factor at play after the establishment of a monetary 
union. Other factors include the further integration of legal systems, of labour markets 
and financial markets, all of which will more plausibly tend to promote cycle 
synchronisation. In short, the theoretical prediction rather points towards 
synchronisation, but some ambiguity remains. Furthermore, a priori considerations 
alone cannot tell us how strong the drive towards synchronisation is. Therefore, an 
empirical answer is needed. 
 
Predictions in 1980s/1990s pointed towards further synchronisation 
 
First indicative findings were already made ex ante, based on studies of the business 
cycle synchronisation that occurred during the 1980s, presumably as a consequence 
of more correlated monetary policy under the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of 
the European Monetary System (EMS). Artis and Zhang(1995)
6 find that in the 
course of the 1980s the business cycles of all EC members, including the Southern 
countries, became more correlated. In concordance with that, Eichengreen observes 
that returns on Paris- and Dusseldorf-listed shares showed a strong convergence 
from the 1970s to the 1980s
7. The presumption in the 1990s was that these 
developments would continue or even accelerate, given the establishment of the 
Single Market in 1992, a more homogeneous fiscal policy to fulfil the Maastricht 
criteria for entry into EMU and the common monetary policy after 1999. 
Kontolemis & Samiei: Policy synchronisation can cause cycle de-synchronisation 
 
But there were also other voices, such as those of Kontolemis and Samiei (2000)
8,
who showed that greater policy homogeneity could also decrease cycle 
synchronisation by restricting countries’ ability to offset asymmetric shocks. This 
worry has been shared in recent years by critics of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP), which restricts the range of fiscal deficit sizes countries are allowed to have. 
Critics of the Pact, many of whom accept in general the need for protection against 
fiscal profligacy, argue that this restriction inhibits countries’ ability to offset 
asymmetric shocks through automatic fiscal stabilisers. In recent years, they saw 
their worries confirmed by the dichotomy between solid growth in some EMU 
members, such as Spain or Ireland, and sluggishness in others, such as Germany or 
 
6 M. Artis and W. Zhang, International Business Cycles and the ERM: Is there a European Business Cycle?,
published in International Journal of Finance and Economics, 1997 
7 Eichengreen, Is Europe an Optimum Currency Area?, NBER Working Paper, 1991 
8 Kontolemis Z. and H. Samiei, The UK Business Cycle, Monetary Policy and EMU Entry”, published as IMF 
Working Paper WP/00/210, 2001 5
Italy, and the dilemma in countries like Germany between fiscally offsetting the 
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Divergence of GDP growth rates across  
EMU in the 1st quarter of 2006
 
Now only painful adjustment via the real exchange rate 
 
In such a situation, the only adjustment mechanism is the real exchange rate. With 
the nominal exchange rate being fixed, uncompetitive economies have to keep 
increases in unit labour costs below those of their peers. First signs of long hoped-for 
improvements in the German job market this summer show that this mechanism can 
work, but the preceding years have also demonstrated that this process is a long and 
painful one, as it implies depression of domestic demand and thus slower growth in 
the short-run. 
 
Permanently lower interest rates destroy old equilibrium 
 
Adjustment is complicated and protracted further by the fact that the change of 
various parameters triggered by entry into EMU has resulted in structural breaks for 
many countries, where the adjustment process has yet to be completed. A case in 
point is Spain, where permanently lower interest rates under EMU have caused a 
boom in the mortgage market and triggered a house price bubble. The expected 
burst of this bubble is currently the biggest downside risk for the Spanish economy. 
 
2. Existing findings on the development of synchronisation 
 
Now enough data available to also analyse post-EMU developments 
 
First investigations of whether heterogeneity has changed after EMU and whether 
such changes are statistically significant have become possible only very recently, 
given the need for a sufficiently large post-1999 dataset. Indeed, several studies on 
this issue have been published as ECB Working Papers since the start of this year. In 
the following, we shall give an overview over the methodologies and results of 
existing studies and shall subsequently see how they can be complemented and 
improved. 
 
In the first quarter of 2006, GDP growth 
rates versus the same quarter of the 
previous year range from 1.0% in Portugal 
to 5.6% in Ireland. 6
Better data on industrial production, but GDP is what we are interested in 
 
Existing studies differ firstly as regards the data they use and secondly as regards 
their methods. Due to the availability of monthly data for all EMU countries, many 
studies look at industrial production data, such as the OECD’s “Index of Industrial 
Production” (IIP), rather than at GDP. The use of this data as a proxy for GDP is 
justified by a historically strong correlation between the two, yet industrial production 
does not cover all of GDP. And while we expect synchronisation to occur more 
quickly in industry than in the economy as a whole, as the former accounts for the 
majority of international trade, ultimately our concern in the context of monetary union 
is GDP as a whole. 
 
Mean correlation is a good indicator of convergence 
 
Massmann and Mitchell consider not only the mean bi-variate correlation with 
Germany or the euro area, but the whole distribution of bi-variate correlations of all 
ERM member state dyads
9 and then look for evidence of decreased cyclical disparity. 
The advantage of looking not only at the mean but also at the variance of bilateral 
correlation coefficients is that one obtains a better understanding of how significant 
changes in the former are. Massmann and Mitchell thus find that rises in the mean 
tend to be accompanied by falls in the variance and fewer movements in the ranking 
of different country pairs’ correlations. This confirms that rises in the mean do indeed 
signify periods of convergence, whereas falls signify divergence. 
 
Correlation highly volatile 
 
Massmann and Mitchell’s examination of the development of the mean correlation 
over time, using not fixed but rolling windows of 3.5-year length
10, reveals that 
periods of convergence and divergence alternate every 2-3 years. Furthermore, their 
occurrence can be related to the operation of different exchange rate regimes and 
other common key macroeconomic policies. Thus one observes a decline in the 
mean correlation after the 1973 collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed 
exchange rates, a rise in the early years of the ERM (early 1980s), subsequently a 
fall in the face of frequent exchange rate realignments, a rapid slump in the aftermath 
of German reunification and the ensuing currency crisis, and then again a rise as the 
impact of the currency crisis seems to be dominated by the establishment of the 
Single Market and the preparation of EMU. For the most recent years, Massmann 
and Mitchell offer no results, as their method of business cycle filtering requires the 
availability of a number of lead observations. Overall, their findings do not render 
observation of longer periods redundant, if we are interested in longer-run 
developments, but they alert us to the fact that correlation measures obtained for 
fixed windows of longer duration depend somewhat on the exact start and end dates 
of these windows. These findings notwithstanding, however, Massmann and Mitchell 
admit that the fit of their proxy “industrial production” for the really interesting variable 
“GDP growth” seems to have loosened somewhat in recent years. It is therefore 
worthwhile to look at some studies that are based on GDP data. 
 
9 From 12 countries, they obtain (12²-12)/2=66 country pairs (dyads) and thus for each period 66 correlation 
coefficients; Of these, they compute both the mean and the variance 
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Artis and Zhang (1995): Synchronisation with Germany under 1980s ERM 
 
Artis and Zhang (1995) look at bi-variate correlations of the cyclical parts of countries’ 
IIP data vis-à-vis Germany on the one hand and vis-à-vis the United States on the 
other hand. They find that under the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM, 1979-93), 
under which member states restricted the fluctuation of their Deutschmark exchange 
rate, member states’ business cycles became less correlated with that of the US and 
more with that of Germany. Although Artis and Zhang cannot check on all other 
factors influencing the business cycles and although their findings do not explicitly 
prove any causality, the findings nevertheless lend further support to the theoretical 
presumption that small open economies under an exchange rate peg will be forced to 
import the shocks occurring in the anchor country: A well-known example is the 
aftermath of German reunification, when the Bundesbank, due to high inflation in 
Germany, raised interest rates and other central banks had to follow although they 
were at best experiencing a small part of the German reunification boom. 
 
But Artis (2003): No evidence of further convergence in the 1993-2001 period 
 
In a 2003 study
11 however, Michael Artis revisits his 1995 findings, now using 
quarterly GDP data until 2001. Again, he investigates affiliations with Germany on the 
one hand and with the US on the other hand. As a benchmark, he compares 
developments in euro-area economies to those of several non-euro OECD 
economies. His verdict is that, in contrast to the ERM period examined in his 1995 
study, the period 1993-2001 is not characterised by further convergence with the 
German cycle. There is evidence of the existence of a common cycle shared by 
Germany, Austria, Switzerland and the Netherlands, as well as a second one shared 
by France, Spain, Belgium, Italy and Denmark. The countries in the second group, 
however, are not more closely associated with each other than with, for example, 
Japan. The UK, Ireland and Norway are not found to be associated with either of 
these two groups. Like Massmann and Mitchell (2003), Artis concludes that the 
process of business cycle convergence is by no means a monotonous one. 
 
Artis’ identification of Germany and France as belonging to different groups comes as 
a surprise, given the huge importance of their bilateral trade. A possible explanation 
though is that after the collapse of the ERM in the aftermath of German reunification 
France decoupled its monetary policy and thus its business cycle more from 
 
11 Artis, Is there a European Business Cycle?, CESifo Working Paper No. 1053, October 2003 
Correlation mean and 95% confidence 
interval, computed by Massmann & 
Mitchell with an “Unobserved-
Components”-filter for business cycle 
dating and 3.5-years rolling windows 8
Germany than, for instance, the Netherlands, which did not widen its exchange rate 
band with the Deutschmark after the 1992/93 ERM crisis. 
 
Benalal: Dispersion of GDP growth rates is now historically low 
 
Benalal et al (2006)
12 , looking first at the degree of dispersion between GDP growth 
rates, find that since 1990 and even more since 1999 the dispersion in annual 
average terms has declined and that the current (2004) level of dispersion is 
historically low, though still higher than within the US or former West Germany. 
These results are confirmed when the fixed periods are replaced by 8-year moving 
averages and are even stronger when only the cyclical components of GDP growth 
rates are used. They are also confirmed by an investigation of the degree of co-
movement (correlation) of cycles
13, which is found to have increased. The 
significance of this is underlined by the fact that no such development is found for 12 
non-European OECD economies. Looking at the sources of remaining heterogeneity, 
they reach the conclusion that since 1990, observed dispersions largely reflected the 
trend rather than just cyclical differences. Of these, a fair share can be explained by 
different demographic developments, given different birth and immigration rates. 
 
Giannone & Reichlin: Growth rate gaps have reached historical low 
 
Giannone and Reichlin (2006)
14 look at output (per capita) levels as well as growth 
rates and business cycle timing. They find that gaps between output levels are 
persistent
15, whereas growth rates and recession timing indicate significant 
synchronisation over the recent years. In fact, the variance of growth rate gaps has 
now reached a historical low. Growth correlations within the euro area are also higher 
than between the euro area and the US, supporting the notion of a unique European 
business cycle. 
 
Böwer & Guillemineau: Greece reduces average correlation under EMU 
 
Böwer and Guillemineau (2006)
16, separating their dataset into the three 8-year sub-
periods 1980-88, 1989-96 and 1997-2004, find that between these periods the 
average correlation first increased from 0.42 to 0.65, then fell to 0.62. This decline, 
however, is observed only if the outlier Greece
17 is included in the sample, otherwise 
the mean correlation rises monotonously. 
 
Concluding this section then, it can be said that the majority of studies find a 
monotonous increase in business cycle synchronisation, both before and after EMU, 
although Artis (2003) is more sceptical for his 1990s period. 
 
12 Benalal, Diaz del Hoyo, Pierluigi and Vidalis, Output Growth Differentials Across the Euro-zone Countries. 
Some Stylised Facts, ECB Working Paper No. 45, May 2006 
13 Co-movement is investigated through Business Cycle Dating, based on a dual-state model in which in each 
period each economy is either in expansion or in contraction, to isolate business cycle duration from amplitude. 
14 Giannone, Domenico, and Lucrezia Reichlin (2005), Trends and Cycles in the Euro-zone: How much 
Heterogeneity and should we worry about it?; Published as ECB Working Paper No 595, March 2006 
15 The exception to this is Ireland, whose income level has been converging to the levels of richer EMU states 
16 Böwer, Uwe, and Catherine Guillemineau, Determinants of Business Cycle Synchronisation across Euro-zone 
Countries, ECB Working Paper No 587, February 2006 
17 Greek GDP growth was subjected to various shocks in the post-1999 period, including its difficult entry into 
EMU in 2001, a massive boom in the run-up to the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens and again a slump thereafter. 9
3. Existing findings on the determinants of synchronisation 
 
Robust
18 determinants of cycle synchronisation vary over time 
 
After computing the average correlation of GDP growth rates, Böwer and 
Guillemineau (2006) regress their measure of synchronisation for each period on 
potential determinants, applying Newey-West corrections for both Heteroskedasticity 
and Autocorrelation
19. They investigate first the traditional core explanatory variables 
trade, trade specialisation and economic specialisation, and then look at the roles of 
both policy and structural variables. Conducting an Extreme-Bounds-Analysis 
(EBA)
20, they find that the set of robust determinants has varied over time. 
 
EMU has boosted intra-EMU trade by 40% 
 
Let us first look at the most frequently discussed connection between monetary and 
business cycle synchronisation – trade. In the first 6 years of EMU, intra-EMU trade 
as a percentage of GDP grew from 4.5 %-points to 6.3 %-points, i.e. by some 40%. 
This increase in intra-EMU trade is particularly noteworthy as in the same period 
further globalisation and the entry of China and India into the world market gave 
significant impetus to trade between advanced economies and the Asian emerging 
market economies and as intra-EMU trade had already been high at the start of 
EMU. 
 
18 A variable is “robust” if its statistical significance is not conditional on the information set, i.e. on which other 
economic variables are included in the equation 
19 Heteroskedasticity occurs when the variance of the error and thus of the dependent variable of the regression 
varies with the explanatory variable, Autocorrelation (Serial Correlation) is correlation between the error terms in 
different periods; Both phenomena impair the reliability of inferences made on the basis of the regression, but this 
can be corrected by using “robust standard errors”, as proposed in: Newey, W.K., and K.D. West, A Simple, 
Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix, Econometrica,
55(3), May 1987 
20 Details are on pp. 19-23 of Böwer and Guillemineau, as well as in Leamer (1981), Sala-i-Martin (1997) and 
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 since the start of EMU
% of GDP10
Frankel & Rose beat Krugman: Trade specialisation increased synchronisation 
 
More interesting than the increase in trade is, of course, its impact on cycle 
synchronisation, i.e. the question as to whether Frankel and Rose or Krugman got it 
right. The answer, as pointed out above, depends on how much of the additional 
trade is intra-industry. In their study of the determinants of business cycle synchron-
isation, Böwer and Guillemineau (2006) conclude that both the trade volume and the 
specialisation pattern have positive impacts on cycle synchronisation.
21 The relation-
ship with the trade volume is robust over the whole period, as well as over the pre-
EMU sub-period, but not over the post-EMU sub-period, whereas that with trade 
specialisation is robust only in the EMU sub-period. This suggests that in the EMU 
period trade content matters more than volume. And the fact that the impact of this 
pattern is positive suggests that a lot of the additional trade is indeed intra-industry. 
 
Key policy variable before EMU was fiscal policy, now it is monetary policy 
 
Next, Böwer and Guillemineau look at policy variables. They find fiscal policy, as 
measured by fiscal deficit differentials, to be a key driver of cycle synchronisation 
before EMU, whereas since then monetary policy heterogeneity, measured by 
interest rate differentials, is found to be more important. For the possible reasons, 
please see the empirical part below. 
 
The more similar economic structures, the closer the business cycles 
 
Finally, considering the structural variables, bilateral differences in competitiveness
22,
stock market indices
23 and labour market flexibility
24 all show the expected signs, i.e. 
the more the countries differ on these accounts the less correlation is observed 
between their business cycles. 
 
However, competitiveness is robust only over the sample as a whole. The total stock 
market index is not robust, only that for cyclical services (includes retail firms, hotel 
chains, media corporations). Labour market flexibility is not robust over any period, 
but this may well be due to difficulties of measurement. To control for exogenous 
factors, Böwer and Guillemineau also include the “gravity variables” – geographical 
distance and differences in population size – among the regressors and find the 
former, but not the latter, to be significant and robust in the EMU period. 
 
Euro area cycle lags US cycle—with less volatility, but more persistence 
Before concluding this section, it is worth looking at Giannone and Reichlin’s (2006) 
investigation of how the Euro area’s cycle is influenced by that of the US. Their 
verdict is that, while intra-US and intra-euro area gaps in output levels are non-
stationary, those between the US and euro area aggregates are stationary: As the 
aggregation averages out idiosyncratic influences, these two roughly follow a 
 
21 The same is true for financial integration, measured as the size of bilateral bank flows 
22 Each country’s indicator of competitiveness is constructed from its HICP-deflated exchange rate, weighted by 
trade shares; as a measure of the distance between two countries, they compute the bilateral differences of the 
countries’ competitiveness indicators and take the absolute value of the sample mean 
23 They take the difference between nominal-GDP-scaled stock market values, given by the Datastream Total 
Market Index and the Cyclical Services Index (CYSER) 
24 The indicator of labour market flexibility uses the bilateral differences of union density and of the OECD 
strictness-of-employment-protection-legislation-index (0-5) from the OECD Labour Market Statistics 11
common trend. In fact, the common euro area cycle is found to lag the US cycle, to 
which it responds with less volatility but more persistence than is found in the US 
cycle. These results are confirmed by data on business cycle timing. While they are 
consistent with Canova et al’s (2004)
25 conclusion that global (US) shocks explain 
much of the fluctuation also in the euro area, they emphasise that the latter is 
characterised by different propagation. 
 
4. Existing findings on impact and importance of heterogeneity 
 
Most output volatility symmetric, so remaining heterogeneity not tragic 
 
When analysing the economic significance of remaining output heterogeneity, 
Giannone and Reichlin (2006) realise that this accounts only for a small share of 
countries’ total output volatility, the remainder is due to common fluctuation. This 
suggests that the remaining heterogeneity is not that tragic after all. 
 
Plus: Ever-better opportunities for volatility insurance through financial market 
 
While Giannone & Reichlin find no clear sign of output level or growth convergence, 
output-conditional consumption since the early 1990s has not converged, i.e. 
proceeding financial market integration allows for increasingly better risk-sharing.
26 
This is another reason why we should not worry too much about persisting output 
heterogeneity. 
 
Giannone & Reichlin emphasise shock; Artis, propagation asymmetry 
 
Looking at how remaining cycle heterogeneity can be reduced, it is necessary to 
identify to what extent asymmetries are driven by asymmetry of shocks and to what 
extent by asymmetric propagation of common shocks. Giannone and Reichlin thus 
ask what, counter-factually, correlations between countries’ and the euro area growth 
rates would have been in the absence of country-specific shocks and find them to be 
very high and stable. This suggests that growth heterogeneities are mostly explained 
by idiosyncratic shocks rather than by asymmetric propagation. The same conclusion 
holds for the US. 
 
The opposite, however, is concluded by Artis (2003), using OLS regression. He 
argues that asymmetric propagation is more important, based on differences in 
financial structures, in the share of manufacturing in GDP and in the relative share of 
oil imports in GDP. Labour market flexibility again fails to prove significant.
27 The 
reason why findings on the main source of heterogeneity differ and which one is 
more informative has yet to be found. 
 
25 Canova, Fabio, Matteo Ciccarelli and Eva Ortega, Similarities and Convergence in G7 Cycles, CEPR 
Discussion Papers, 2004 
26 This confirms the results obtained by Kalemli-Ozcan et al, 2004 
27 Note, however, that the measure used, the NAWRU (Non-Accelerating-Wage Rate of Unemployment), is only 
one out of various possible indicators, none of which is without caveats; Furthermore, the NAWRU has changed a 
lot over the period under consideration, questioning the usefulness of using its period-average as a regressor 12
5. Data and methodology of our own study 
 
Look at co-movement of GDP growth and at the dispersion of inflation 
 
For the present study, we use two sets of data. Firstly, we look at the degree of co-
movement between quarterly rates of GDP growth and secondly at the dispersion of 
national inflation rates. This choice has been made with a view to why we are 
studying business cycle synchronisation, which is the fit for each country of the 
common monetary policy under EMU. The main indicator the European Central Bank 
(ECB) looks at when fixing interest rates is the “Monetary Union Index of Consumer 
Prices” (MUICP), a weighted average of member states’ “Harmonised Indices of 
Consumer Prices” (HICP). Inflation itself depends on the one hand on structural 
factors specific to the respective country, dealt with below, on the other hand on the 
country’s position in the business cycle, the best indicator of which is the rate of real 
GDP growth. So we look first at GDP growth and then at the actual dispersion of 
national inflation rates. Finally, we briefly investigate the dispersion of two indicators 
of policy variables which we suspect to have a major impact on business cycle 
synchronisation: Dispersion of real interest rates as a measure of monetary policy 
heterogeneity and dispersion of structural deficits as a measure of fiscal policy 
heterogeneity. 
 
Using the Phillips curve 
 
When we take a look at GDP growth, we do so because we are interested in how 
GDP growth rates influence a country’s inflation rate’s deviation from the country-
specific mean, which is determined by various structural factors dealt with below. A 
relationship between GDP growth and inflation, along the lines stipulated by Alban 
Phillips (1958)
28, can be considered to hold in the short-run, even though Robert 
Lucas (1976) has shown its breakdown in the long-run. Over our horizon of interest, 
7-year-periods, GDP can thus be considered a major determinant of inflation. 
 
The Pearson product-moment correlation as a measure of co-movement 
 
We are interested in how these GDP growth rates move together, and the most 
obvious measure of such co-movement is the Pearson product-moment correlation, 
i.e. the co-variance normalised through division by the two growth rate series’ 
standard deviations. The co-variance measures how one variable fluctuates as the 
other one does and thus describes the strength of association between the two 
variables. The normalisation allows us to scale the resulting index values to lie 
between -1 (perfect negative association) to zero (no linear association) to +1 
(perfect positive association). Three things are worthwhile noting here. Firstly, the 
correlation coefficient is entirely symmetric, i.e. there is no meaningful distinction 
between a dependent and an independent variable. Secondly, one must bear in mind 
 
28A.W. Phillips, in The relationship between unemployment and the rate of change of money wages in the UK 
1861-1957, Economica, 1958, noticed an empirical negative relationship between unemployment and wage 
inflation; Since the former is positively correlated with GDP growth and the latter with consumer price inflation, a 
negative relationship between those two was subsequently inferred. Robert Lucas in 1976 famously showed that 
this relationship breaks down in the long-run, as governments try to exploit it for policy-making, but the 
relationship can be considered to hold in the short-run. Economists today still disagree on whether the causality in 
this short-run tradeoff works from output growth to inflation (roughly the New Keynesian position) or rather the 
other way round (roughly the Monetarist position), but for the present purpose only the existence of a positive 
relationship is relevant, regardless of the direction (or even the mere existence) of causality. 13
that the Pearson correlation will pick up only linear but not non-linear relationships. 
Thirdly, while correlation supports the notion of causation, it does not prove it. 
Frequently, we encounter “spurious correlation”, where both variables are 
simultaneously caused by a third variable. Bearing these three features in mind, 
Pearson’s r is indeed an appropriate measure for our present purposes, since we are 
at this stage only interested in how closely business cycles move together, and not in 
any causal mechanism. Its suitability as a measure of convergence or divergence is 
furthermore confirmed by the findings of Massmann and Mitchell (2003), as pointed 
out above, that rises (falls) in the average bilateral correlation coincide with 
decreases (increases) in the standard deviation of correlations. 
 
Separate the time series into “ERM”, “Maastricht” and “EMU” periods 
 
To gauge the impact of different stages of European integration, as determined by 
political decisions, we have separated our sample into three periods: 1983-89, 1992-
98 and 1999-2005. The first phase captures most of the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) period, the second captures the Single Market and EMU preparation period 
starting with the Treaty of Maastricht, and the third captures the first seven years of 
EMU. All three periods thus last seven years. Unfortunately, we are unable to also 
compare the ERM period to pre-ERM (i.e. pre-1979) times, as we do not have 
suitable data. Furthermore, following Giannone and Reichlin (2005), we ignore the 
years 1990-91, which are characterised by outliers due to German reunification and 
its aftermath and are thus not representative of the general development in EMU. 
Finally, note that for reasons of data availability our sample does not include 
Luxembourg and includes Ireland only as of 1997. 
 
Weight countries’ correlations with the same weights as used for ECB policy 
 
After computing for each country and each period the Pearson product moment 
correlation between the country’s quarterly GDP growth rates and those of the euro 
area as a whole, we take the weighted average correlation for each of the three 
periods and see how this average changes across the periods. It is in computing 
these averages where our study differs most from the previous studies on GDP 
growth rates quoted above. While these compute only the unweighted average of 
countries’ correlation coefficients, we consider it more appropriate to weight these 
coefficients in the same manner as the ECB weights national inflation rates when 
computing the “Monetary Union Index of Consumer Prices” (MUICP) used for 
monetary policy. This makes sense because our concern about business cycle 
heterogeneity is its adverse impact on the monetary policy fit. Since we are interested 
in the net gains of welfare for the EMU area as whole, it would – to put it informally –
be wrong to give equal weight to – say – a few Greeks suffering from a monetary 
policy that is not well-suited for them as to the benefits many more French are 
enjoying from monetary union. If we were interested in the balance of benefits from 
the point of view of Greece alone, we would have to look only at Greece’s individual 
deviation from the euro area aggregates, but this is not the issue of this study. The 
weight of each country is based on its share of private domestic consumption 
expenditure in private consumption in the euro area. Weights for 1996-2005 have 
been obtained directly from the ECB, those for 1990-1995 have been estimated by 14
Eurostat. For the years prior to 1990, we use the same weights as for 1990.
29 To 
show what difference the use of these weights makes, we have also computed the 
unweighted averages. 
 
Test for significance of changes in the mean correlation 
 
After finding out how our summary measure of business cycle synchronisation 
changes across periods, we also test the significance of these changes. We want to 
test the null hypothesis that the correlation in the population has not changed against 
the two-sided alternative hypothesis that it has changed in either direction. To be 
able to conduct such a test, we need to know the sampling distribution of correlation 
coefficients. It turns out that, unless the true population coefficient equals zero, this 
distribution is skewed towards zero, which is undesirable for an exact hypothesis test. 
Fortunately though, Fisher (1921) has suggested a remedy: By transforming all 
correlation values according to the formula  )
1
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= , we obtain a transformed 
set of values, the sampling distribution of which is asymptotically normal. We can 
then compute the test-statistic Z by taking the difference between the z-values for the 
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= , follows a Standard Normal 
Distribution, so that for a two-sided test values greater than 1.96 indicate that the 
change in the correlation across periods is significant at the 5% level.
30 
For inflation, look at dispersion rather than co-movement 
 
In the case of GDP growth, we were interested in the degree of co-movement as a 
measure of the synchronisation of business cycles, because of the impact on 
countries’ inflation rates. We looked at the degree of co-movement rather than at the 
degree of GDP growth dispersion at any point in time, acknowledging the fact that 
countries’ GDP growth rates fluctuate around different means (with the exception of 
Irish GDP growth, which fluctuates around a catch-up trend). 
 
In the case of inflation rates, however, we must look directly at the degree of 
dispersion at each point in time, as the ECB bases its monetary policy directly on 
inflation, rather than on its development over time or just on its cyclical part. To 
evaluate the fit of monetary policy to each country’s individual needs, only dispersion 
at that moment matters, while a high degree of co-movement alone is of no value. 
Thus it would be possible for two countries’ inflation rates to move perfectly in line 
with each other, yielding a correlation coefficient of 1.0, even if one fluctuated around 
a mean of say 1.5% and the other around 4%. The observation of a perfect 
correlation in this case would indicate a high synchronisation of business cycles and 
 
29 This means that we give slightly “too little” weight to the small countries that experienced above-average 
growth in this period. This mistake would, if at all, be significant only for Ireland, which is not included in our first 
sub-period anyway. 
30 To compute the Z-statistic for the change in average correlation, we take the weighted averages of the 
individual-country coefficients for each period and use 11*(7*4)-11*3=275 degrees of freedom for computing the 
standardisation factor s 15
yet the situation would not be comforting with a view to the common monetary policy, 
which is based on the weighted average of national inflation rates. 
 
The reason for this ambiguity between dispersion and co-movement is that inflation 
rates are determined not only by the country’s position in the business cycle, but also 
by various other factors. The best-known of these is inflation expectations, which 
have converged strongly since the start of EMU, but there are various other factors 
which lead to persistence of inflation heterogeneity across countries. These include 
inter alia the convergence of price levels within EMU, the adjustment of indirect taxes 
or administered prices, a diverging development of productivity levels (the “Balassa-
Samuelson-effect”) and heterogeneity in house price developments.
31 These factors 
cause heterogeneity in inflation rates, but they do not impair their co-movement, 
which to the extent that these factors remain unchanged is based on synchronised 
business cycles. On the other hand, different propagation of common oil price and 
external exchange rate changes does impair the co-movement of business cycles. 
Need to compute weighted dispersion of inflation rates 
 
Just as we decided to compute the weighted rather than the unweighted average of 
GDP growth rate correlations, we now compute the weighted rather than the 
unweighted standard deviation of national inflation rates.
32 
The exact formula for computing the weighted standard deviation for each month is: 




















= , where xi are the inflation rates in the countries i=1,…,12, and 
wi are the weights each country has in the respective month (adjusted yearly).  w x is 
the weighted mean of inflation rates and N’ is the number of non-zero weights in each 
month. In addition, we have also computed the unweighted standard deviation, the 












31 For details  see: Sachverständigenrat zur Beurteilung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Die Chance 
nutzen--Reformen mutig voranbringen. Jahresgutachten 2005/06 , 624ff., Wiesbaden, December 2005  
32 For the standard deviation of inflation rates, the same choice is made by the German Council of Economic 
Experts in: Sachverständigenrat zur Beurteilung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Erfolge im Ausland—
















Source: OECD Comparable Table, DBResearch
Unweighted synchronisation in EMU
Unweighted average of EMU countries' GDP growth rates with that of
the euro area as a whole
6. Results 
 
Unweighted correlation average first rises, then falls—solely due to Greece 
 
To start with, we present the unweighted averages of GDP growth correlations. 
 
With this measure, we find that the mean correlation has risen (and significantly so) 
in the Maastricht period, but has fallen back somewhat under EMU. The same trend 
was observed by Böwer and Guillemineau quoted above. To see why the average 
correlation has declined under EMU, we look at developments by country, realising 
that the key determinant behind this development of the aggregate is the landslide 
fall of the correlation measure for Greece. 
 
In the EMU period, the correlation between Greek and euro area GDP growth is not 
only very low, but even negative, at a value of -0.02. If we were to drop the Greek 
outlier from our sample, we would observe a monotonous rise in the average 
correlation. This is done by Böwer and Guillemineau, after making the same 
observation. The question that comes up then is which development should count, 










Source: OECD Comparable Table, DBResearch
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The Greek misfit
Correlations between EMU members' GDP growth with those of the euro area as 
a whole by country17
Weighted average shows: Monotonous convergence 
 
Fortunately, this problem disappears when one uses our methodology of computing 
the weighted average of countries’ correlations. With a justification well-rooted in 
theory, the Greek development is now down-weighted relative to developments in the 
larger economies. As a result, we now observe a monotonous increase in the 
average correlation. For the same reason, we observe higher correlation levels in all 
three periods. 
 
But only Maastricht rise proves significant 
 
Besides the fact that the correlation now rises at both period transitions, it stands out 
that the increase under EMU is much smaller than the one observed in the run-up to 
EMU. Possible explanations of this result and its implications are considered in the 
final section below. Whatever the explanation, the relatively small size of the post-
1999 change alerts us to the need to test the significance of the observed changes. 
The finding is a clear significance of the 10.5%-change after 1992, with a test-statistic 
of 2.62, but a t-value of only 0.95 for the second, 2.4%, change. We therefore fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of no change between the pre- and post-EMU periods. It 
remains to be seen whether a clearer picture of post-EMU developments will emerge 
















Sources: OECD Comparable Table, DBResearch
Strong growth rate convergence in the 1990s
Weighted average of EMU countries' GDP growth rates with that of
the euro area as a whole18
Weighted dispersion lower than unweighted dispersion 
 
Let us now look at the dispersion of inflation rates across countries, for which we 
have data ranging back to the year 1961. As with our measure of GDP correlation, 
we find that reagarding almost all observations the weighted measure paints a more 
positive picture than the unweighted measure, as weighted dispersion lies almost 
always below the unweighted measure of dispersion. This is what is to be expected, 
since the former measure down-weights the more extreme developments in the 
smaller countries on the European periphery such as Greece. Both measures, 
however, follow largely the same trends. 
 
Furthermore, we observe an explosion of the degree of dispersion in the 1970s, 
reflecting differences in the strength of impact of the oil price shocks across 
countries, depending inter alia on their dependence on oil imports and on the degree 
to which monetary policy institutions were willing to accommodate the rises in 
inflation that followed the oil price hikes after the two oil crises. 
 
By the start of EMU, inflation dispersion has fallen to historically low levels 
 
Most interesting for our present purposes is, of course, the observation that the long-
run trend for the degree of dispersion, on either measure, has seen a strong 
decrease between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s. The last drop is witnessed in 
the final phase of preparations for EMU, i.e. between 1996 and 1999, and since then 
dispersion has remained largely stable at a relatively low level. It is now similar to 
inflation dispersion between the 14 US Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and 
only slightly higher than that between the four US Census regions
33, although 
differentials within the euro area tend to be somewhat more persistent. 
 
To see how this development fits with our results on GDP growth rates, we compute 
the dispersion averages for each of our three periods. As with GDP growth rates, we 
see a significant drive of convergence in the Maastricht period, followed by a further, 
not significant convergence under EMU. 
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Fiscal policy: “I still do it my way” 
 
Before concluding the results section, let us have a look at the two policy variables, 
which Böwer and Guillemineau regarded as robust determinants of business cycle 
synchronisation, monetary policy heterogeneity and fiscal policy heterogeneity. A 
good measure of the former is given by the divergence of real interest rates. In a 
monetary union with a common nominal interest rate, correlation and dispersion of 
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"I still do it my way" Weighted standard deviations of EMU 
states' structural deficits, 
1996-2004 declined in the run-up to EMU; 
but have since risen again. 20
An issue not yet dealt with, however, is the heterogeneity of countries’ fiscal policy 
stances, as measured by their structural deficits. As a measure of the heterogeneity 
of countries’ fiscal policy stances, we have computed the weighted and unweighted 
standard deviations. Since we have complete data ranging back only to 1996, no 
more than indicative findings can be made. 
 
The verdict is that on both measures dispersion fell until the start of EMU in 1999, but 
rose again until 2003. This reflects the fact that while countries’ eagerness to achieve 
admission to EMU made them restrict their degree of fiscal policy activism before 
EMU, these restrictions were not as effective afterwards, as evidenced by the 
manifold breach of the SGP in recent years. 
 
7. Interpretation and implications of the results 
 
The results of our study confirm the general trend towards greater synchronisation of 
business cycles, as well as a fall in the dispersion of inflation rates, both of which one 
is happy to see when thinking about the welfare effects of common monetary policy 
in a monetary union. In contrast to the earlier period, however, the synchronisation 
drive so far observed since the start of EMU cannot – or at least not yet – be shown 
to be significant. 
 
A priori, three not mutually exclusive explanations suggest themselves. Firstly, it may 
be that the potential for synchronisation had already been largely exhausted in the 
run-up to EMU. Secondly, there is the possibility that it simply takes some more time 
for the whole impact of EMU to materialise. Thirdly, the reason may be that some 
necessary further steps towards economic and financial integration have yet to be 
taken. As so often, the truth is probably a combination of the three explanations. 
 
When considering what further developments we expect for the coming years, it is 
worthwhile to distinguish two possible impact channels between monetary union and 
business cycle synchronisation. On the one hand, there are the direct impacts of 
monetary union in the sense of a common monetary policy.
34 On the other hand, 
there is an indirect impact in that monetary union politically facilitates the 
implementation of further integration-promoting policies, such as the Single European 
Payments Area (SEPA), which is currently being discussed and promoted by the 
ECB, in particular, or in a wider sense the aim of  the European Commission to move 
further towards the completion of a Single Market not only for goods but also for 
services. 
 
Expectation for the coming decade: Further, albeit limited, synchronisation 
 
Our expectation for the coming decade is that it is particularly through the second 
channel that further synchronisation may be promoted, although the potential for this 
seems limited compared to what we have seen in the past 20 years. Giannone and 
Reichlin have argued that the remaining heterogeneity is not tragic, as it accounts 
only for a limited proportion of countries’ total output volatility, but then again the 
growth and inflation differences observed in recent years between Germany, France 
 
34 But note that a common nominal interest rate implies a common real interest rate only to the extent to which 
inflation rates have converged. We have seen that this has largely been the case, but also that so far some 
heterogeneity in real interest rates remains also under monetary union. 21
and Finland on the one hand and Spain or Ireland on the other hand suggest that this 
small proportion may still be annoying. 
 
Given that potential for further integration-promoting policies at the European level is 
now limited, policy-makers at the national levels are now called upon to further 
reduce the costs of monetary union. As a significant proportion of growth differentials 
is not just cyclical but there are trend differences, not only macroeconomic, but also 
structural reforms are required. Particularly because potential for further cycle 
synchronisation is limited, they will need to improve their economies’ flexibility and 
thus their ability to cope with the remaining heterogeneity. This includes the need for 
measures like the Services Directive or the unconditional implementation of the 
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